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1 Introduction.
The balance between rules and discretion has generated a great deal of debate among economists. Most
of this debate has been in monetary policy making (Blackburn and Christensen, 1989; Fischer, 1990; and
Clarida et al., 1999). In their seminal paper Kydland and Prescott (1977) demonstrated that policy rules
are superior to discretion in monetary policy. Taylor (1993, p.197) stresses that there is a substantial
consensus in macroeconomics that “policy rules have major advantages over discretion in improving
economic performance.”
In a diﬀerent setting, discretion finds favour among management scientists. Many hold the view that
allowing firms flexibility enhances performance (Kelman, 1961; Beyer and Trice, 1978; Marcus, 1988;
Strebel, 1987), while rule-based culture stifles innovation within an organisation (Eisenhardt, 1989).
A third area of research in which discretion has been debated is the design of law and regulation.
While strict laws and regulations ensure the protection of rights, fairness, and equal treatment, and
oﬀer greater levels of predictability, they also create rigidities and the erosion of trust, learning, and
cooperation (Sitkin and Bies, 1994). It is found that more flexible approaches to regulation have many
advantages (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984; Marcus, 1988). This appears to be confirmed by empirical
studies, where more flexible regulation is found to lead to increased productivity (Majumdar, 1997).
However, there is some empirical evidence that suggests that too much law is as problematic as too much
discretion, and that an appropriate balance between legal rules and discretion is needed (Majumdar and
Marcus, 2001).
The focus of this paper is on a diﬀerent situation where a balance between rules and discretion is
sought. We posit a decision maker (committee) that observes two noisy signals — a rule signal that is
publicly observed and a discretion signal known only to the decision maker. The decision maker may
be sensitive to political and social pressure and tries to find a balance between rules and discretion that
minimises a specific loss function. Typically, committees always try to find a balance between rules
and discretion within an environment of constraints and pressure. Political and social pressure aside,
combining rules and discretion is more optimal than relying on a single measure. The reason is that both
rule and discretion signals are noisy and, hence, there is a chance that the information contained in one
signal is not available in the other. In the grading of research quality, rules oﬀer greater transparency and
equity, but rules may not account for certain characteristics. For example, suppose some sort of journal
ranking is adopted and research papers are judged solely on the basis of where they were published.
However, one can find top quality pieces of research in lower ranking journals. Clearly, these would not
be picked up by the above rule, but can be easily accounted for via a discretionary measure.
We use the data from the 2001 UK Research Assessment Exercise to empirically examine some of the
predictions of our model. We find evidence that both rules and discretion were used in the 2001 RAE for
UK economics departments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a simple model of committee
decision-making. Section 3 provides a brief review of journal quality ranking in the recent literature.
Section 4 discusses the main features of the UK RAE 2001. Section 5 discusses the main data and
modelling considerations. Sections 6 and 7 discuss the results of the estimated models and the last
section concludes.
2 The Model
A committee has to give a verdict on a characteristic (quality) of a subject (department). The quality Q
is not observed directly. Instead, noisy signals
R = Q+ e (1)
D = Q+ pω + v (2)
where µ
e
v
¶
∼ (0,σ2I) (3)
Signal R is a “rule” measure, such as publicly available quality indices, and is observed publicly. Signal
D is a “discretionary” measure, observed only by the committee. The quantity p is some characteristic
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of a department, other than quality, that can influence the committee’s discretion (for example, political
pressure), and ω ∈ [0, 1] is the degree to which the committee is submissive or vulnerable to this influence.
We assume that p, ω, and σ2 are known to the committee.
As true quality of the department is unobservable, the committee estimates it given available informa-
tion. Conditional on p and ω, the optimal (unbiased minimum variance) estimator of Q is the ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimator,
Qˆ =
1
2
(R+D − pω). (4)
Higher values of σ2 imply higher noise of observed quality measures and can thus be thought of as a
measure of accuracy of the estimator. Clearly, an estimator of quality based solely on one of the two
observed measures would be sub-optimal. Based on the estimated quality and other information the
committee oﬀers to the department the grade πo based on a combination of rule and discretion:
πo = λR+ (1− λ)D. (5)
The department anticipates to receive the grade πa comprising publicly available quality measure R and
full gain from its pressure on the committee:
πa = R+ p. (6)
We posit the following loss function for the committee:
L = ω(πa − πo)2 + (1− ω)(πo − Qˆ)2. (7)
The term (πa − πo) in the first part of the loss function is the grade gap reflecting the diﬀerence
between the grade the department anticipates to obtain and the grade oﬀered by the committee. This
can be thought of as a social constraint, because the committee wishes to, say, minimise the possible
protest generated by a large grade gap.1 The term (πo − Qˆ) in the second part of the loss function
represents the gap between the optimal grade and the grade oﬀered by the committee. A committee
that is completely insensitive to political pressure would set the grade oﬀered equal to the optimal grade
Qˆ. Higher values of ω correspond to higher sensitivity of the committee to pressure. Note that we use
sensitivity ω in both (7) and (2), assuming that the committee has the same sensitivity to department
and social pressure.
The committee chooses λ ∈ [0, 1], the optimal combination of rule and discretion, to minimize the
expected value of the loss function L. When the constraint 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 is not binding, the solution is
interior and satisfies the first order condition:
d
dλ
EL = 0
or, using (7),
ω
d
dλ
E
£
(πa − πo)2
¤
+ (1− ω) d
dλ
E
h
(πo − Qˆ)2
i
= 0. (8)
Using (1)-(6) we obtain:
d
dλ
EL = 2λ
h
(pω)
2
+ 2σ2
i
− 2σ2(1 + ω) (9)
Hence, for optimal λ we have
λ∗ =
1 + ω
2 + (pω/σ)2
(10)
The second order condition holds trivially given σ2 > 0:
d2
dλ2
EL = 2(p2ω2 + 2σ2) > 0.
1Quadratic loss suggests that the committee believes that there is also a cost to oﬀering a higher grade than anticipated.
This can be seen as the protest of competing departments, a watchdog, or simply a budget constraint.
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It is easy to see that when the committee is not sensitive to political pressure (ω = 0) it puts equal
weights on the rule and discretion and oﬀers the optimal grade. When there is no pressure from the
department, p = 0, the optimal weight put on the rule is
λ∗ =
1 + ω
2
.
In this case, the grade oﬀered still depends on the committee’s sensitivity to pressure, but this eﬀect
originates from the loss function (7) rather than the discretion equation (2). Thus, the committee always
puts more weight on the rule since λ∗ > 12 . The department, whose aim is to reduce λ
∗ is worse oﬀ when
it is incapable of exercising pressure on the committee.
When there is no noise (the quality of the department is perfectly observable) the committee puts full
weight on discretion, λ∗ = 0. As noise increases λ∗ also increases:
∂λ∗
∂σ2
=
(pω)2(1 + ω)h
2σ2 + (pω)
2
i2 > 0
and
lim
σ2→∞
λ∗ =
1 + ω
2
.
Thus, when the noise is very high, the more submissive the committee is to political pressure (the closer
to unity ω is), the more weigth it puts on the rule. Conditional on p and ω, the expected grade oﬀered,
E(πo) = Q+ (1− λ∗)pω, decreases with noise increasing.
The optimal weight put on the rule is inversely related to the pressure from the department for given
σ2 and ω 6= 0:
∂λ∗
∂p
= − 2pω
2σ2(1 + ω)h
2σ2 + (pω)
2
i2 < 0.
The expected grade oﬀered increases in p for ω 6= 0. Therefore, if the department can choose the level of
pressure prior to the committee’s decision, it will try to increase it as much as possible (subject to some
cost constraint).
The eﬀect of ω on λ∗ and πo is not unambiguous and may change sign depending on p and σ2.
Diﬀerentiation of (10) with respect to ω gives
∂λ∗
∂ω
= −σ
2(p2ω2 + 2p2ω − 2σ2)
(2σ2 + p2ω2)2
(11)
Therefore, λ∗ is increasing in ω for 0 ≤ ω ≤ ω¯ and decreasing in ω for ω¯ ≤ ω ≤ 1, where ω¯ =
min{(p1 + 2σ2/p2− 1); 1}. The threshold ω¯ depends on the noise to pressure ratio (σ/p). Thus, as long
as the sensitivity of the committee is lower than the threshold, higher sensitivity means increased use
of rule measure. A department aims at decreasing λ∗ and thus requires the threshold to be as small as
possible to reverse the eﬀect of ω on λ∗. The department thus needs to put the highest pressure possible
for fixed σ. As the signal becomes noisier, the department needs additional pressure in order to reduce λ∗.
This reversal of the eﬀect of committee’s sensitivity is mainly due to its presence in both the loss function
(7) and the discretion equation (2). For a given pressure, as the signal on the quality becomes noisier,
the committee is relatively more concerned about the social pressure compared with the department’s
pressure. At an extreme, when the signal becomes totally unreliable (σ2 → ∞) a completely sensitive
committee (ω = 1) would not use discretion at all to avoid criticism even though the rule signal is equally
unreliable.
2.1 Heteroscedastic Case.
These results can be easily generalized for an arbitrary covariance structure of the error terms in R and
D. Assuming µ
e
v
¶
∼
µ·
0
0
¸
,
·
σ2e σev
σev σ
2
v
¸¶
(12)
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the optimal estimator for quality Q is the generalised least squares (GLS) estimator
Qˆ = αR+ (1− α)(D − pω) (13)
where
α =
σ2v − σev
Σ2
. (14)
and
Σ2 ≡ V ar(v − e) = σ2e + σ2v − 2σev. (15)
Using (12)-(15) in the loss function, from the first order condition for optimal λ we get
λ∗ =
α+ (1− α)ω
1 + (pω)2/Σ2
(16)
or, equivalently,
λ∗ =
σ2v − σev + (σ2e − σev)ω
Σ2 + (pω)2
(17)
Conditional on the structure of the covariance matrix of the noise, the eﬀect of p and ω on the
optimal decision of the committee is the same as above. To analyze the eﬀect of the the variances of
random components in rule and discretion we assume, for simplicity, that the two random components
are uncorrelated (σ2ev = 0). Then
α =
σ2v
Σ2
measures the proportion of the noise from discretion in the total noise. Diﬀerentiation of (16) with respect
to α gives
∂λ∗
∂α
=
1− ω
1 + (pω)2/Σ2
(18)
which is non-negative. Intuitively, the noisier is the discretion signal, the more weight the committee
puts on the rule, and vice versa.
It is plausible to assume that random disturbances to R and D are (positively) correlated. To analyze
the eﬀect of correlation between the two random components we diﬀerentiate (17) with respect to the
covariance σev:
∂λ∗
∂σev
=
(1− ω)(σ2v − σ2e)− (1 + ω)(pω)2
[Σ2 + (pω)2]2
.
A highly influenceable committee (ω close to unity) puts more weight on the rule and less on discretion,
the lower is the covariance between two noises. In general, the optimal weight put on the rule increases
with the covariance between e and v if
σ2v − σ2e >
1 + ω
1− ω (pω)
2.
In particular, if the committee is not influenceable at all (ω = 0), the weight put on the rule increases
with the increase in covariance if the rule is less noisy than discretion (σ2e < σ
2
v), and vice versa.
3 Journal Quality and the Ranking of Departments.
Until now, the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) has been the only formal source of department
ranking, and largely determines how research funding is allocated in the UK’s higher education institu-
tions. On the other hand, a large number of informal, metric-based, department rankings can be found
in the literature. Among these are Dusansky and Vernon (1998) in the US, Kalaitzidakis et al. (1999) in
Europe, Lucas (1995) in Canada, and Harris (1990) in Australia. Many ranking exercises focus mainly on
a limited number of leading journals (Conroy et al., 1995; Dusansky and Vernon, 1998, and Kalaitzidakis
et al., 1999). Journal ranking is also increasingly being used to rank individual academics (Baltagi, 1999).
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These informal rankings are predominantly based on some measure of citations. However, both
perception-based and citation-based ranking methodologies are found in the literature (Harzing, 2001;
Liner, 2002; Theoharakis and Hirst, 2002; Swidler and Goldreyer, 1998; Kalaitzidakis et al., 1999; Burton
and Phimister, 1995).
There is an on-going debate over the reliability of citation-based rankings. While citations are an
objective measure of journal quality, they have been criticized for being biased (Seglen, 1997) and for
being a measure influence rather than excellence (Beed and Beed, 1996). However, perceptions can
easily be criticized for being subjective. For example, Axarloglou and Theoharakis (2003) found that
economists’ perception of journal quality depends on their geographic origin, school of thought, journal
aﬃliation, field of specialization and research orientation.
Almost all existing rankings are based on rule measures. These measures have two main elements,
namely the choice of a set of research journals and the choice of functions of perceptive or objective
quality variable, such as the number of citations. Only a handful of studies have attempted to match
some rule based ranking of journals with the outcome of the RAE. One notable example is Burkitt and
Baimbridge (1995), who use the number of papers published in the Economic Journal as an explanatory
variable for the ratings awarded in the 1992 RAE, and find a significant positive relationship. Marston and
Ayub (2000) repeated Burkitt and Baimbridge (1995) study for the UK accounting departments rating
in the 1996 RAE. Their study is based on four UK accounting journals. Campbell et al. (1999) also
studied the RAE outcome in UK law departments. In the US, Swidler and Goldreyer (1998) formally test
the link between top finance journal publications and salaries of finance faculty at US research-oriented
universities. The main limitation of these studies is the reliance on a very limited number of ‘top-tier’
journals.
4 The 2001 UK RAE.
The latest UK Research Assessment Exercise, and the recent Roberts’ report that proposes its replacement
(Roberts, 2003), have generated a great deal of debate among academics in the UK. The interest in the
RAE and its future form is not confined to the UK, however. The UK RAE model has attracted a near-
worldwide interest and is often cited as a benchmark. This is particularly true for Ireland, Australia, New
Zealand and Hong Kong (von Tunzelmann and Mbula, 2003; Boston, 2002). The Roberts’ report used
information and views from various sources, including oﬃcial documents, higher education institutions,
researchers and other stakeholders. Among the issues raised in these studies are the use of metrics and
expert judgement. The Roberts’ Report (2003, Annex E) identified strong support among stakeholders
in favour of the use of metrics alongside expert review in research assessment. The overwhelming view is
that future assessments should give a greater role to metrics. However, the report recommended that the
new system of research assessment must be based upon the judgement of experts. Assessment committees
may or may not use performance indicators (metrics) to inform their judgement.
The main criterion for assessment in the UK RAE is research quality. Research academics were
classified as international, national and sub-national levels, depending on the quality of the their research.
Oﬃcially, RAE panels used their judgement to form a view on the quality of all submitting staﬀ. Thus,
it seems likely that the norm is discretion rather than rule. This is corroborated by the oﬃcial line that
panels were concerned only with the quality of the research output and not with the form it took (THES,
14 December 2001). Thus, whether a book, a chapter or a paper article, the RAE panels are supposed
to have judged individual research outputs in their own merits. However, it is also acknowledged by the
RAE that those outputs that have been through a rigorous process of peer review would not be examined.
This reflects the view that the general reputation of a journal strongly aﬀects how a research paper is
assessed (Vick et al., 1998). It is therefore suspected that there has been at least some use of rule like
measures of journal quality in the panel’s assessment. This is especially likely at the level of top tier
journals.
There has been much criticism directed at the way the RAE has been conducted. One of the most
ardent criticisms was made by Universities UK (UUK), which argued that the same conclusions could
have been reached with much less eﬀort and that the RAE was hardly cost-eﬀective (THES, 08 November
2002). Indeed, the financial cost of the RAE has been estimated at $36 million (Lewis, 2003).
In economics and econometrics, a total of 3255 research items were submitted in the RAE 2001. Of
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these, 2464 were refereed journal articles, and 791 other types of submission such as authored and edited
books and working papers. The journals that had 10 or more articles submitted to the RAE are shown in
Table 1. The highest number of submitted papers for a single journal was 118 articles for the Economic
Journal. Econometrica, the Quarterly Journal of Economics and the American Economic Review had
40, 25 and 18 submissions respectively. For simplicity, no distinction is made between the various types
of submissions, such as full papers, notes and proceedings.
[Table 1 about here]
5 Data Selection and Modelling Considerations.
The main variables of interest in this paper are rules, discretion and department pressure. Clearly, none
of these are observed perfectly. The rules variable is the least problematic because information on rules,
albeit noisy, is normally available to the public. We describe below how we construct a variable that can
be used as a proxy for rules.
Measuring discretion is more problematic, since, by definition, it is not publicly observable. However,
there are a few ways in which the presence of discretion in the committee’s decision can be detected. The
first is the use of political pressure by the department. Our model suggests that the optimal weight the
committee puts on rules is inversely related to the level of pressure (see (10)). Empirically, significant
pressure would indicate a positive weight on discretion in the committee’s decision. The second is the
presence of noise in the rules signal. When the rules signal does not deliver perfect information on the
department quality, the committee uses both rules and discretion in its decision, with the optimal weight
of the discretion being positively related to the noise level in the rules signal (see (18)). This can be
assessed empirically by comparing the predictions of the fitted model, which is based partly on rules,
with the actual outcome of the committee’s decision. Finally, there could be some publicly available
information on the committee’s use of discretion.
In the empirical part of this paper, we add two additional means of assessing discretion. Firstly, it
might be useful to adopt a hybrid variable, based partly on rules and partly on discretion, as a measure
of discretion. In using this variable, the intention is to at least capture part of the discretion used by the
committee. A definition of this variable is provided in the empirical section. The second means is based
on the argument that the committee’s violation (or bending) of its own rules entails its use of discretion.
We use the Gini coeﬃcient to test for such a violation as explained below.
Political pressure is not observable either. In this paper, we proxy political pressure using department’s
size. Although it is hard to accept that departments actively pressurise RAE panels, it is possible
that departments are endowed with certain characteristics that put pressure on the panels passively. A
department’s size is likely to encompass many of these influencing factors. Larger departments are more
likely to have renowned academics and, thus, panels are likely to over-rate these departments. Larger
departments are also more likely to have a higher absolute number of top quality research articles. Even
though panels are supposed to look at a measure of relative performance, it is likely that it would be
hard for them to ignore the absolute number of top quality research output. Larger departments are also
influential politically because of their position in the educational system and their higher relative share
of research output in the country. Some large departments also happen to enjoy historical and political
prominence. Panels are likely to be reluctant to give Cambridge and Oxford, for instance, lower grades.
The following quotation from the vice-chancellor of the University of Central England points both to the
position of influential universities and to the general pressure the RAE panels are likely to feel:
“Any new system that has the eﬀect of removing research money from Oxbridge et al is a
nonstarter. It is not even worth thinking about the row that would result. Equally, any
system that achieved a greater concentration of research funding would be deeply unpopular
and would risk leading to the exclusion of the originality and occasional good fortune that
leads to the development of new ideas and concepts.” (Knight, 2002).
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5.1 Proxies for Rules.
To derive a proxy for rules we need to derive a metric for measuring journal quality. As both perception-
based and citation-based measures may have their particular merits and limitations, we use both measures
in ranking journal articles.
In this paper we use three citation-based indices: impact factor, immediacy index and cited half-life.
All three are available from the Journal Citation Report (JCR). The impact factor measures a journal’s
relative importance in terms of relative citation. The Immediacy Index is a measure of how quickly
the “average article” in a journal is cited, while the cited half-life index reflects the age of the majority
of cited articles published in a journal. We also use two perception-based indices: the Harzing (2001)
classification and the Axarloglou and Theoharakis (2003) ‘worldwide’ quality index (WWQI). The latter
study is based on a survey of opinions of 2,103 economists worldwide. The Harzing (2001) classification is
based on various surveys based in England (Lancaster, Nottingham, Bradford, and Aston) and overseas
(The Netherlands and Hong Kong). These surveys were carried out between 1994 and 2000.
For each department, the sum of immediacy, impact, half-life and WWQI scores were accumulated.
These reflect the overall absolute departmental performance with respect to each criterion. Similarly,
we use the total number of papers classified as international by the Harzing compilation, and the total
number of working papers. The total number of ‘other research output’ items, which mainly includes
unclassified refereed journal articles,2 authored books, chapters in books and edited books, are also used.
We mimic the RAE panel assessment of individual researchers by taking the ratio of the total of
each index to total submissions. In this way we have, for instance, the average performance in terms
of immediacy index per submitted research output. Thus, this average performance can increase in two
ways: one is by increasing the index itself (higher quality journal), and the other is by increasing the
number of journal papers. For example a department that submits only books and chapters in books will
have zero immediacy or impact scores.
Due to the potentially large number of explanatory variables and the limited number of observations,
we explored the possibility of data reduction. Factor analysis was used to obtain the latent factor(s)
generating the five average quality scores (impact, immediacy, half-life, WWQI, and Harzing Interna-
tional). The results suggest a single significant principal component, which accounts for almost 84% of
the variability of the 5 average quality scores. This standardised factor represents the per-submitted-item
quality performance of a given department. We label this ‘AQI’ for average quality index. This is our
main proxy for rules.
The average number of working papers and ‘other research output’ items are also potential proxies
for rules. Moreover, besides the quality of published research outputs, the 2001 RAE also defined inter-
national and national excellence in terms of postgraduate research activity and external research income.
Thus, to assess whether the RAE panel took postgraduate activity and external research income into
account, we consider two additional variables, namely the total number of PhD degrees awarded and the
total external funds obtained by each department for the period covered by the RAE. These are four
additional proxies for rules that can be tested empirically.
5.2 Proxy for Pressure.
The criteria used for the 2001 RAE ranking clearly suggest a relative comparison rather than an absolute
one. Thus, as a rule, department size should not be influential in the RAE grading. In order to account
for the suspected size eﬀect, we include the total number of submissions as a proxy for size and, hence,
pressure. This is preferred to the number of submitted staﬀ because many academics have less than 4
submissions.
5.3 Proxies for Discretion.
In the construction of a hybrid variable, we explore the possibility that the RAE panel might give top
tier journals more value than the rules measure suggests. We therefore counted the number of ‘top tier’
journal articles in each department. Top tier is defined here as journals that have scores greater than
2These include some well-known journals, such as Econometrics Journal, Journal of Time Series Analysis and Oxford
Development Studies.
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or equal to 1 for the impact factor, 0.1 for immediacy index, 10 for half-life, and 20 for WWQI. The
Rand Journal of Economics has the lowest scores with these criteria. We call this the ‘seniority eﬀect’ in
the sense that the committee may use discretion to correct for the perceived understatement of top tier
journals.
Another proxy, discussed earlier, is the Gini coeﬃcient. At least oﬃcially, the average performance of
departments is not the main focus of the RAE panels. Instead, the appraisal of individual academics is
supposed to be the criterion for overall department rating. Thus, the overall rating of a department may
depend crucially on the distribution of papers among academic staﬀ. Specifically, for the same average
quality level, a department that has a more even distribution of papers among its staﬀ has a better chance
of obtaining a higher grade. For example, a department that has one academic with four international
papers and another with four national papers will be inferior to the one that has two academics with
two international and two national papers each, even though on average they are identical.3 Thus, a
department that has more equality in terms of research quality output should be expected to score higher
in the eyes of the RAE panel. To test for the presence of this eﬀect a measure of asymmetry or inequality
is required. We adopt the Gini coeﬃcient as a proxy for the extent of the RAE panel’s appraisal of
individual academics.
To calculate the Gini coeﬃcient we used the impact factor. The total impact score was computed
for each submitted staﬀ, and the cumulative contribution of each staﬀ to the total departmental impact
score was used to calculate the Gini coeﬃcient using the formula:
GINI = 1− 1
n
nX
i=1
(Φi − Φi−1)
where Φi is the department’s total impact score share of individual i and Φ0 = 0. The Gini coeﬃcient
takes a value between zero for perfect equality and 1 for perfect inequality.
5.4 The Probit Model.
The 41 RAE grades for economics departments are used as the dependent variable in a probit model
using the above proxies as regressors. Because of data limitation we only consider three grades, namely
3, 4 and 5. Thus, no distinction is made between 3a and 3b grades, and 5 and 5* grades.
An ordered probit model is used to model the relationship between RAE ratings and selected inputs
or explanatory variables. The probit model consists of estimating a model based on a utility index given
by Ii = β
0xi where xi is a vector of exogenous variables and β is a vector of parameters. In an ordered
probit model, there are additional threshold parameters. For instance, if there are three states: RAE3
(yi = 0), RAE4 (yi = 1) and RAE5 (yi = 2), the probit model involves one additional parameter, µ,
which enters the likelihood function. The probabilities for each state are given by
P (yi = 0) = 1− F (Ii)
P (yi = 1) = F (µ− Ii)− F (−Ii)
P (yi = 2) = 1− F (µ− Ii)
where F is the Normal cumulative distribution function. The model can be readily generalised to include
more states.
6 A Data-Driven Model.
We start our empirical exercise with a simple agnostic model. The aim for now is not to test any theory
but to simply consider the RAE results as an output and attempt to link such an output with a number
of inputs. The flexibility of this model makes it possible to see the significance as well as the marginal
impact of each input.
3Assuming that 2 international and 2 national papers (or better) earns an academic the ‘international’ status.
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The initial model includes size, seniority level, average quality index (AQI), the ratio of total working
papers to total submitted items, the ratio of other refereed and non-refereed research outputs to total
submitted items, the ratio of total PhD candidates to total submitted staﬀ, the ratio of total funds to
total submitted staﬀ, and the Gini score of inequality. Table 2 provides summary statistics for these
variables.
[Table 2 about here]
The unrestricted model, shown in the first part of Table 3, strongly suggests the insignificance of
working papers, funding and the Gini score. All these variables were found to be insignificant by both
individual and joint tests for removal from the initial model. Size also appears to be insignificant in the
unrestricted model but subsequent restricted models suggest strong significance. The selected model,
presented in the second part of Table 3, shows strong significance of all parameters except the intercept,
which is still significant at the 10% level. The likelihood ratio statistic for the three restrictions was 2.69,
which is insignificant at the 1% level.
As suggested earlier, both size and seniority level have a positive impact on the probability of a
higher RAE rating. Higher average quality of research output is highly significant in determining RAE
ratings, while the ratios of the other outputs have a negative impact. Note that the insignificance of the
coeﬃcient of working papers suggests a neutral eﬀect, in the sense that it neither increases nor decreases
the probability of a higher rating. The likely reason for this is that many ‘new’ academics are given some
sort of exemption, and it is generally observed that new academics have a higher proportion of working
papers for obvious reasons.
[Table 3 about here]
The estimated model gives rise to two major questions. The first is how well would our model predict
the RAE outcome? The other question is what is the individual eﬀect of each of the significant variables
on the probability of the various ratings?
Using the restricted model, we generate probabilities for each department given size and the other
metrics. The results are shown in Table 4. Prediction in probit models is not straightforward, since
what we obtain is predicted probabilities of outcomes rather than outcomes per se. However, if we apply
a convention whereby the outcome is selected on the basis of the highest probability our model would
suggest seven wrong predictions out of the 41 cases. Three of these misses are borderline cases with
probabilities that are almost equal. These are London Guildhall (under-rated), Leicester (over-rated),
and Newcastle (under-rated). The other four wrong predictions are more clear-cut as well as interesting.
The first two universities are a 5-4 rating mismatch. While Queen Mary obtained a five our model
suggests a 4 rating with probability 0.586. On the other hand, Bristol obtained a four but our model
suggests a 5 rating with probability 0.619. The other pair of universities is a 4-3 rating mismatch. These
are Surrey, which was given a 3 but predicted to be a 4 with probability 0.747, and Wales Swansea, which
obtained a 4 but was predicted to be a 3 with a similar high probability.
Notice that the probabilities of 5* rated departments are virtually 1 in most cases. However, the
probabilities for Cambridge, Nottingham and Oxford are also close or equal to one. This is probably due
to the size eﬀect as the three departments are among the largest.
[Table 4 about here]
Although the estimated model is helpful in telling which variables are significant in RAE rating, it tells
us little about the individual impact of each variable. In Table 5 we provide the approximate marginal
eﬀects on the probabilities of RAE rating. The estimated eﬀects are based on the mean values of the five
variables (Green, 2000, p.879). The probability for a 3, 4 and 5 rating of an ‘average’ department (i.e.
based on mean values) is 0.0029, 0.9491 and 0.0480 respectively. An average department has about 80
submitted items, seven top tier papers, zero AQI score, 39% of its submitted items in the ‘other output’
category, and about one PhD student per academic staﬀ.
The fifth, sixth and seventh columns provide the marginal eﬀect of a one unit increase of each variable
(relative to the mean value) on the probability of three, four and five rating respectively. Clearly, all but
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‘other output’ have a positive impact on the probability of a 5 rating. For example, a department that
has one additional top tier paper relative to an average department sees its probability of a five increase
by 0.0223, and a department that has two students per academic staﬀ would see the probability of a 5
increase by 0.131. On the other hand, every 10% increase in ‘other output’ sees the probability of a 5
reduced by about 0.0368.
A better insight of the marginal impact of each variable is given in the last column of Table 5. The
figures show the change in the probability of a 5 rating when a typical average department is compared
with the best (worst) department with respect to the variable in question. Surprisingly, seniority level is
by far the most influential variable. The diﬀerence in the probability of a 5 rating between an average
department and a similar department with the highest number of top tier journal articles is a staggering
0.6233. Meanwhile, what should have been expected to be the most influential variable — the average
quality index — has a maximum increase of 0.1932. More surprisingly, size is almost as equally important
as the average quality index. The other variables are similar in magnitude with the highest proportion of
PhD students increases the probability of a 5 by about 0.14. On the other hand, the worst department
in terms of having the highest proportion of other output sees its probability of a 5 rating reduced by
about 0.12.
[Table 5 about here]
7 Estimating the Discretion Model.
The data driven model estimated in the previous section appears to mimick the RAE panel satisfactorily,
with a significant fit and a good prediction of the RAE outcome. However, the mechanism in which rules,
discretion and pressure operate is not captured properly by the data driven model. Even though data
driven models enjoy flexibility and are often regarded as more poweful tools for forecasting, in our case
the data driven model oﬀers little help in confirming or rejecting the discretion model proposed in the
previous sections. In this section, therefore, we provide a direct assessment of our discretion model.
To keep things simple, we assume the setting (1)-(3). However, we dispose of the assumption that the
committee uses OLS (or GLS) to compute the optimal estimate Qˆ of quality Q. Instead, we assume that
the committee uses specific weights, γ and (1−γ) on rule and discretion, respectively, and estimate these
weights within the model. One reason for this choice is flexibility: we are trying to “guess” what estimator
the committee used, rather than impose a particular estimator (OLS or GLS) on the committee. Another,
and perhaps more important, reason is that the committee might be asked by a controlling authority to
use specific weights on rules and discretion in its decision. For example, the controlling authority may
want the committee to ignore the rules completely (and, thus, sets γ = 0). In the context of the RAE
exercise, the funding bodies requires the panels to use their ‘expert judgement’ in evaluating the quality
of research. Even though the panel might be informed by some bibliometric measure, we do not expect
the optimal estimator Qˆ to be based on the OLS or GLS estimators. Thus the weight γ put on discretion
may be diﬀerent from 0.5 as in the case of OLS. If, for example, the panels are supposed to use their
expert judgement, we would expect γ to be less than 0.5.
Under this new assumption equation (4) becomes
Qˆ = γR+ (1− γ)(D − ωp) (19)
It is easy to show that the optimal rules weight λi of department i in this case is given by
λi =
γ + (1− γ)ω
1 + (ωpi)2/2σ2
(20)
Each department is oﬀered a grade
πoi = λiRi + (1− λi)Di (21)
where λi is given by (20). Note that V ar(π
o
i ) = (λ
2
i +(1− λi)2)σ2. If we observe noisy signals R˜+ e and
D˜ + v of R and D respectively, then we can write (21) as
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πoi = λiR˜i + (1− λi)D˜i + i (22)
where  if a function of e and v and R˜ and D˜ are exogenous.
To motivate the probit model for the RAE exercise we note that πoi is not observable. The RAE
committee only discloses a limited scale of grades. For illustration purposes we assume for the time being
that the RAE committee only declares high or low quality. Thus, in a probit setting, the unobserved
grade oﬀered can be written as
πoi = β0 + λiR˜i + (1− λi)D˜i + i (23)
The intercept β0 is needed for estimation purposes (Green, 2000, p.819). The disturbance term is
heteroscedastic since V ar(i) = (λ
2
i +(1−λi)2)σ2, but this can be easily incorporated in the probit model
by simply dividing (23) by
p
V ar(i).
In this simple binary setting, we do not observe πoi . Instead, what we do observe is the outcome ‘high’
(say y = 1) if πoi > 0 and ‘low’ if π
o
i ≤ 0 (say y = 0).4 The model can be easily generalised to multinomial
outcomes.
To complete the probit model we need to specify the rule and discretion equations. Because of the
limited number of observations, we have to keep the number of regressors to a minimum. As discussed
earlier, we proxy the rule measure by AQI, pressure by Size(= p), and discretion measure by Seniority.
Thus, the complete model consists of (23) and (20) and the equivalent of (1) and (2)
R˜i = β1AQIi
D˜i = β2Seniorityi + β3ωSizei
The parameters of interest are γ (the optimality parameter), ω (the social/political sensitivity of the
committee), σ2 (the noise of the signals R and D), and βi, i = 0, 3. To preserve compatibility with the
theoretical model we standardised the three regressors in order to have identical scale.
The estimated model is shown in Table 6. All parameters are significant and have the expect signs.
The suggested model fits the data satisfactorily, and with a log-likelihood value very similar to the data
driven model, despite using three regressors only.
The estimated model indicates that the RAE panel is not highly sensitive to political or social pressure,
but the significance of ω clearly indicates some level of sensitivity of the RAE committee to social pressure.
The significance of β3 also points to the political sensitivity of the RAE panel.
Contrary to expectations, however, the RAE panel appears to have used a slightly higher than ex-
pected γ to form its optimal estimator Qˆ. However, even though the estimate of 0.674 for γ is highly
significant, the 95% confidence interval is [0.192,1.156] and would therefore not reject the null hypothesis
γ = 0.5 at the 5% level of significance. A more convenient way of testing the null hypothesis γ = 0.5 is to
use γ = exp(η)/[1+exp(η)] and estimate η instead. This way, the null γ = 0.5 is expressed as η = 0. The
estimation yielded an estimate ηˆ = 0.828, which implies γˆ = 0.696, which is close to the value estimated
directly. However, the t-statistic of ηˆ was 1.83, suggesting insignificance of ηˆ. This was also supported
by a likelihood ratio statistic close to zero. Thus, the RAE panel is likely to have put equal weights on
both rule and discretion measures. The parameters associated with rules, discretion and pressure are all
significant and imply a positive impact of these regressors on the probability of a higher grade.
[Table 6 about here]
The level of discretion used varies greatly from one department to another. The estimated levels
of discretion are given in Table 7. The lowest values for λ were 0.04 (Oxford), 0.07 (LSE) and 0.08
(Cambridge). As expected, these universities appear to enjoy the highest levels of discretion. The
highest values for λ were around 0.71 for Birkbeck, Loughborough and Queen Mary. The average value
is 0.433, indicating a higher use of discretion on average.
The predictive performance of this theory based model suggests its superiority over the data driven
model. First, it has six incorrect predictions compared with seven in the data driven model. More
4We may think of this as the RAE panel knowing the grade but choosing to give a discrete grading of low and high.
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importantly, five of these are 3 to 4 rating mismatch. Only Bristol is (again) predicted a 5 but was given
a 4 rating. The detailed predicted probabilities are given in Table 7.
[Table 7 about here]
8 Conclusion.
This paper presents a model of committee decision-making when both rules and discretion are available.
Some empirical evidence on the performance of economics departments in the RAE 2001 is oﬀered.
Among the predictions of our model are that higher pressure always increases the level of discretion,
while increased noise of observed signals increases the level of rules. The sensitivity of committees
to political and social pressure can have both negative and positive impact on the level of discretion,
depending on the sensitivity of the committee and the noise to pressure ratio. The RAE 2001 result was
related to a combination of proxies for rules, pressure and discretion using two probit models. The results
suggest significance of both rules and discretion. Pressure was found to matter in the determination of
department’s assessment of research quality.
Although we did not obtain perfect predictions most grades were correctly predicted by both the data
driven and the discretion models. However, despite using only a fraction of explanatory variables, the
discretion model produced a more satisfactory prediction than the data-driven model. This lends more
credence to our model.
In the data driven model, even though the oﬃcial line was to consider both funding and PhD students
only the ratio of PhD to staﬀ was found to be significant. Working papers appear to have a neutral
eﬀect, but other forms of research output, such as books have a detrimental impact on the grading of
departments.
The results show that the flexibility of a discretionary system may come at a price. In our case, the
RAE panel was clearly biased in favour of larger departments. In fact, based on the marginal impact,
size was almost as influential as the average quality metrics. However, the biggest marginal impact was
by far due to our hybrid proxy for discretion. The presence of discretion also appears to have been
exercised so as to go against the oﬃcial standing that rankings are based on the proportions of staﬀ. The
insignificance of the Gini coeﬃcient indicates that it is more likely that the overall department average
performances influenced the panel’s decision, even though it should not have been so.
The discretion model was tested empirically and was found to fit well with real life data. The
estimation confirms the expected impact of rules, discretion and pressure. The results also suggest that
the panel was not highly sensitive to political and social pressure. Finally, contrary to expectation, the
panel appears to have used OLS rule as the optimal estimator for quality.
The report by Sir Gareth Roberts (2003) proposed the introduction of quality metrics, but their use
was left to the ‘discretion’ of the RAE panel. However, the funding bodies have recently decided to
continue with expert judgement as the oﬃcial method of evaluation of departments. In this respect, it
is perhaps more appropriate to be surprised that the 2001 RAE panels could have used rules at all as
suggested by the significance of our proxies for rules. Still, there is always the possibility that the panel’s
discretionary view coincided with certain rule measures. However, our model of discretion and pressure
suggests that this would be unlikely.
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Table 1. Journals with 10 or more submissions in RAE 2001. 
Title 
Total 
Papers Title 
Total 
Papers 
Economic Journal  118 Review of Economics and Statistics 17 
Manchester School  77 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv  17 
Economics Letters  74 Applied Economics Letters 16 
Oxford Economic Papers  64 Bulletin of Economic Research 16 
Economica 55 Journal of Comparative Economics  16 
European Economic Review 55 Journal of Development Studies 16 
Journal of Public Economics  55 British Journal of Industrial Relations. 15 
Review of Economic Studies  53 Economic Modelling 15 
Journal of Econometrics 51 Journal of Industrial Economics  14 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 51 Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 14 
Journal of Economic Theory 48 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 14 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy 47 
International Journal of Industrial 
Organization  13 
Applied Economics 44 Journal of Agricultural Economics 13 
Econometrica  40 Journal of International Development 13 
Games and Economic Behavior 32 Journal of Labor Economics  13 
World Development 31 Journal of Population Economics 13 
Journal of Political Economy  30 RAND Journal of Economics 13 
Journal of Development Economics 27 European Journal of Political Economy  12 
Quarterly Journal of Economics  25 
International Journal of Finance and 
Economics 12 
International Economic Review 24 
Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 12 
Journal of Health Economics  24 Journal of Monetary Economics  11 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 23 Public Choice 11 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 21 Scandinavian Journal of Statistics 11 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 20 Applied Financial Economics 10 
Journal of International Economics  20 Canadian Journal of Economics 10 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 19 Health Economics 10 
Econometric Theory 19 History of Political Economy  10 
American Economic Review  18 Journal of Macroeconomics 10 
Economic Theory  18 Labour Economics 10 
Journal of Mathematical Economics 18 Scandinavian Journal of Economics 10 
Regional Studies 18   
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Main Variables. 
Series Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum 
Size 79.39 48.02 26 236 
Seniority 7.049 7.906 0 35 
AQI 0 1 -1.958 1.771 
Working 
papers 
0.121 0.091 0 0.388 
Other 
output 
0.392 0.182 0.096 0.714 
Funding 48.595 55.449 0 254.048 
PhD 0.938 0.562 0 2.004 
Gini 
coefficient 
0.466 0.1 0.271 0.668 
 
 
 
Table 3. Estimation Results for the Data-Driven Model. 
 Unrestricted Model Selected Model 
 
 
Parameter 
Value t-statistic p-value 
Parameter 
Value t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 0.986 3.024 0.002 0.550 1.720 0.085 
Threshold 4.401 7.893 0.000 4.428 8.775 0.000 
Size 0.007 1.483 0.138 0.011 2.271 0.001 
Seniority Level 0.265 3.738 0.000 0.224 3.396 0.002 
AQI 1.063 2.743 0.006 1.093 3.135 0.002 
Working papers -2.029 -0.918 0.358    
Other (Ref. & Non-ref.) -3.909 -5.048 0.000 -3.688 -4.656 0.000 
PhD 1.424 4.199 0.000 1.312 3.938 0.000 
Funding -0.004 -0.509 0.610    
GINI -0.028 -0.037 0.970    
 Log Likelihood: -10.902 Log Likelihood: -12.247 
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Table 4. Predicted Probabilities for RAE Grades (Data-Driven Model). 
University 
 
P(3) 
 
P(4) 
 
P(5) 
 
Predicted 
Rating 
Actual 
Rating 
1. Birkbeck College 0.0000 0.0479 0.9521 5 5 
2. Brunel University 0.0001 0.7505 0.2494 4 4 
3. City University 0.9637 0.0364 0.0000 3 3 
4. Keele University 0.6497 0.3503 0.0000 3 3 
5. London Guildhall University 0.4887 0.5113 0.0000 4 3 
6. LSE  0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 5 5* 
7. Loughborough University 0.8031 0.1969 0.0000 3 3 
8. Manchester Metropolitan University 0.9947 0.0053 0.0000 3 3 
9. Queen Mary, University of London 0.0000 0.5857 0.4143 4 5 
10. Royal Holloway, University of London 0.0024 0.9435 0.0541 4 4 
11. University College London 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 5 5* 
12. University of Aberdeen 0.8068 0.1932 0.0000 3 3 
13. University of Birmingham 0.0566 0.9412 0.0022 4 4 
14. University of Bristol 0.0000 0.3811 0.6189 5 4 
15. University of Cambridge 0.0000 0.0073 0.9928 5 5 
16. University of Dundee 0.7906 0.2094 0.0000 3 3 
17. University of Durham 0.0031 0.9511 0.0459 4 4 
18. University of East Anglia 0.0169 0.9725 0.0106 4 4 
19. University of East London 0.9859 0.0142 0.0000 3 3 
20. University of Edinburgh 0.0031 0.9516 0.0453 4 4 
21. University of Essex 0.0000 0.0010 0.9990 5 5* 
22. University of Exeter 0.0000 0.0931 0.9069 5 5 
23. University of Glasgow 0.0757 0.9229 0.0014 4 4 
24. University of Kent at Canterbury 0.2652 0.7347 0.0001 4 4 
25. University of Leicester 0.0000 0.5198 0.4802 4 5 
26. University of Liverpool 0.2935 0.7064 0.0001 4 4 
27. University of Manchester 0.0001 0.7235 0.2765 4 4 
28. University of Newcastle 0.0000 0.4703 0.5297 5 4 
29. University of Northumbria at Newcastle 0.9999 0.0001 0.0000 3 3 
30. University of Nottingham 0.0000 0.0293 0.9708 5 5 
31. University of Oxford 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 5 5 
32. University of Sheffield 0.9441 0.0559 0.0000 3 3 
33. University of Southampton 0.0000 0.1911 0.8089 5 5 
34. University of St Andrews 0.0107 0.9726 0.0168 4 4 
35. University of Stirling 0.4393 0.5607 0.0000 4 4 
36. University of Strathclyde 0.0143 0.9731 0.0126 4 4 
37. University of Surrey 0.2531 0.7468 0.0001 4 3 
38. University of Sussex 0.4504 0.5496 0.0000 4 4 
39. University of Wales, Swansea 0.7145 0.2856 0.0000 3 4 
40. University of Warwick 0.0000 0.1062 0.8938 5 5* 
41. University of York 0.0000 0.0213 0.9787 5 5 
  
 
 19 
 
 
Table 5.Marginal effects on probabilities of RAE rating.  
 
Mean Min. Max. Change in 
P(RAE=3) 
Change in 
P(RAE=4) 
Change in 
P(RAE=5) 
Max. Impact 
P(RAE=5)  
Size 79.390 26 236 -0.0001 -0.0010 0.0011 0.1723 
Seniority Level 7.049 0 35 -0.0020 -0.0204 0.0223 0.6233 
AQI 0 -1.958 1.771 -0.0096 -0.0995 0.1091 0.1932 
Other Output 0.392 0.096 0.714 0.0323 0.3360 -0.3683 -0.1186 
PhD  0.938 0.000 2.004 -0.0115 -0.1195 0.1310 0.1396 
 
 
 
Table 6. Estimation results (Discretion model). 
 
 
Parameter 
Value t-statistic p-value 
Intercept (β0) 0.213 13.365 0.000 
Threshold 5.560 8.808 0.000 
AQI (β1) 0.227 8.600 0.000 
Seniority Level (β2) 0.262 4.811 0.000 
Size (β3) 0.827 2.247 0.025 
σ2    0.006 4.478 0.000 
ω  0.138 4.049 0.000 
γ 0.674 2.742 0.006 
 Log Likelihood: -12.905 
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Table 7. Predicted Probabilities for RAE Grades (Discretion Model). 
 
 
Lambda 
 
P(3) 
 
P(4) 
 
P(5) 
 
Predicted 
Rating 
Actual 
Rating 
1. Birkbeck College 0.71776 0.0000 0.0636 0.9364 5 5 
2. Brunel  0.47360 0.0000 0.8054 0.1946 4 4 
3. City  0.28182 0.9462 0.0538 0.0000 3 3 
4. Keele  0.43898 0.7277 0.2723 0.0000 3 3 
5. London Guildhall  0.40620 0.3797 0.6203 0.0000 4 3 
6. LSE  0.07608 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 5 5* 
7. Loughborough  0.71886 0.8803 0.1197 0.0000 3 3 
8. Manchester Metropolitan  0.42783 0.9582 0.0418 0.0000 3 3 
9. Queen Mary 0.71568 0.0000 0.4580 0.5421 5 5 
10. Royal Holloway 0.48548 0.0000 0.8669 0.1331 4 4 
11. University College London 0.30279 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 5 5* 
12.  Aberdeen 0.63980 0.8271 0.1730 0.0000 3 3 
13.  Birmingham 0.63980 0.1161 0.8839 0.0000 4 4 
14.  Bristol 0.61545 0.0000 0.4267 0.5734 5 4 
15.  Cambridge 0.08996 0.0000 0.0008 0.9992 5 5 
16.  Dundee 0.45033 0.5732 0.4268 0.0000 3 3 
17.  Durham 0.42783 0.0000 0.9097 0.0903 4 4 
18.  East Anglia 0.45033 0.0024 0.9945 0.0031 4 4 
19.  East London 0.25458 0.9012 0.0988 0.0000 3 3 
20.  Edinburgh 0.39573 0.0002 0.9791 0.0207 4 4 
21.  Essex 0.39346 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 5 5* 
22.  Exeter 0.47360 0.0000 0.3537 0.6463 5 5 
23.  Glasgow 0.60649 0.0004 0.9857 0.0139 4 4 
24.  Kent at Canterbury 0.54636 0.0297 0.9703 0.0000 4 4 
25.  Leicester 0.59479 0.0000 0.3614 0.6386 5 5 
26.  Liverpool 0.25458 0.6203 0.3797 0.0000 3 4 
27.  Manchester 0.25964 0.0000 0.8637 0.1363 4 4 
28.  Newcastle 0.33806 0.0000 0.8403 0.1597 4 4 
29.  Northumbria at N. 0.24217 0.9969 0.0032 0.0000 3 3 
30.  Nottingham 0.19392 0.0000 0.0022 0.9978 5 5 
31.  Oxford 0.04007 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 5 5 
32.  Sheffield 0.59479 0.8298 0.1702 0.0000 3 3 
33.  Southampton 0.33612 0.0000 0.0085 0.9915 5 5 
34.  St Andrews 0.61794 0.0000 0.9792 0.0208 4 4 
35.  Stirling 0.43898 0.6184 0.3816 0.0000 3 4 
36.  Strathclyde 0.67776 0.2521 0.7480 0.0000 4 4 
37.  Surrey 0.61794 0.1900 0.8100 0.0000 4 3 
38.  Sussex 0.63980 0.9322 0.0678 0.0000 3 4 
39.  Wales, Swansea 0.50962 0.1859 0.8141 0.0000 4 4 
40.  Warwick 0.21318 0.0000 0.1449 0.8552 5 5* 
41.  York 0.15490 0.0000 0.0001 0.9999 5 5 
 
 
